Abstract. In the following paper we present a new semantics for the well-known strategic logic atl. It is based on adding roles to concurrent game structures, that is at every state, each agent belongs to exactly one role, and the role specifies what actions are available to him at that state. We show advantages of the new semantics, analyze model checking complexity and prove equivalence between standard atl semantics and our new approach.
Introduction
One of the most intensively studied [8, 9, 16] areas of research in the field of multi-agent systems are strategic or cooperation logics -formalisms that allow for reasoning about agents' strategies and behavior in a multi-agent setting. Two of the most known logics are Marc Pauly's Coalition Logic (cl) [10, 11] and Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman's Alternating-time Temporal Logic (atl) [5] , which can be considered a temporal extension of Coalition Logic. Both these logics gained much popularity and generated a 'zoo' of derivatives [15, 13, 1, 3, 2] .
This popularity is in no small part due to relative high expressive power of both cl and atl, but also due to low complexity of model checking problems for these respective logics. Model checking of Coalition Logic can be solved in polynomial time in the size of the model and the length of the formula [10] . It remains polynomial for atl as well [5] , which is considered a very good result. However, as investigated by Jamroga and Dix [7] , in both cases the number of agents must be fixed. If it is not then model checking of atl models represented as alternating transition systems is NP-complete, and if the models are represented as concurrent game structures (cgs) it becomes Σ 2 Role-based semantics for ATL
The language of ordinary atl is the following, as presented in [5] :
where p is propositional letter, and A is a coalition of agents. We follow standard abbreviations (e.g. for ∅ ) and skip connectives that are derivable.
Concurrent Game Structures with Roles
In this section we will introduce concurrent game structures with roles (rcgs) and consider some examples. We will be using the notation [n] = {1, . . . , n}, and we will let A B denote the set of functions from B to A. We will often work with tuples v = v 1 , . . . , v n and we will often view v as a function with domain [n] and write v(i) for v i . We will do addition and subtraction on tuples of the same arity component by component, e.g. for v = v 1 , . . . , v n , v = v 1 , . . . , v n , v − v = v 1 − v 1 , . . . , v n − v n . Given a function f : A × B → C and a ∈ A, we will use f a to denote the function B → C defined by f a (b) = f (a, b) for all b ∈ B.
Definition 2.1. An rcgs is a tuple H = A, R, R, Q, Π, π, A, δ where:
-A is a non-empty set of players. In this text we assume A = [n] for some n ∈ N, and we will reserve n to mean the number of agents. -Q is the non-empty set of states.
-R is a non-empty set of roles. In this text we assume R = [i] for some i ∈ N.
-R : Q × R → ℘(A), such that for every q ∈ Q we have
• For all r, r ∈ R, if r = r then R(q, r) ∩ R(q, r ) = ∅ • r∈R R(q, r) = A For a coalition A ⊆ A we write A r,q for the agents in A which belong to role r at q, i.e. A r,q = R(q, r) ∩ A.
-Π is a set of propositional letters and π : Q → ℘(Π) maps states to the propositions true at that state.
+ is the number of available actions in a given state for a given role.
-For A = [n] = {1, . . . n}, we say that the set of complete votes for a role r in a state q is V r (q) = {v r,q ∈ [n] [A(q,r)] | 1≤a≤A(q,r) v r,q (a) = |R(q, r)|}, the set of functions from the available actions to the number of agents performing the action. The functions in this set account for the actions of all the agents. The set of complete profiles at q is P (q) = r∈R V r (q). For each q ∈ Q we have a transition function at q, δ q : P (q) → Q defining a partial function δ : Q × q∈Q P (q) → Q such that for all q ∈ Q, P ∈ P (q), δ(q, P ) = δ q (P )
To illustrate how rcgs differs from an ordinary concurrent game structure, we provide some examples.
Example 2.1. We construct an example similar to the well-known train-controller scenario [5] , but in contrast to the original, in our scenario there are n t trains. Consider a turn-based synchronous game structure with roles S train = A, R, R, Q, Π, π, A, δ where:
-A = {1, . . . , n t , n t + 1}. There are n t trains and one controller.
-R = {train, ctr}. There are two roles: one for trains and one for the controller. -Q = {q 0 , q 1 , q 2 , q 3 }. -R(q i , train) = [n t ], and R(q i , ctr) = {n t + 1}, for all q i ∈ Q.
-Π = {out of gate, in gate, request, grant} -π(q 0 ) = {out of gate}, π(q 1 ) = {out of gate, request}, π(q 2 ) = {out of gate, grant}, π(q 3 ) = {in gate}. Figure 1 presents the example in a visual way. The model can be seen as a generalization of the classical train-controller example. In q 0 we stay in q 0 unless at least one train issues a request. In q 1 the controller behaves as before; it can postpone making a decision (staying in q 1 ), reject all requests (going to q 0 ), or accept the requests (going to q 2 ). In q 2 the trains can choose to enter the tunnel, but only one of them may do so; if nobody attempts to enter the grant is revoked (or relinquished), if more than one train attempts to enter we stay in q 2 , and finally if (the trains reach an agreement and) only one train enters we go to q 3 . In q 3 any train may decide that the train in the tunnel has to leave (returning to q 0 ), and the train in the tunnel must comply. This reflects the homogeneity among players in the trains role. The action of deciding to leave the tunnel is shared among all trains, and the train actually in the tunnel remains unidentified.
h(0, n t ), 1i 
. . . Notice that in the single-train case (n t = 1), the train can not wait before entering the tunnel after being granted permission (and retain the permission). This could of course easily be avoided by adding another action. More importantly, in the case of several trains, the controller can not distinguish between the different trains, so permission must be granted to all or none. This is a consequence of the strict homogeneity in the model: not only are the agents homogeneous in terms of the actions available to them, we can not reasonably distinguish between them as long as they remain in the same role. Notice that this feature allow us to add any number of trains to the scenario without incurring more than a linear increase in the size of the model (total number of profiles). This would not be possible if we did not have roles. If the model above was to be rendered as a concurrent game structure, the number of possible ways in which trains could act would be exponential in all states where trains have to make a choice of what action to perform. This would be the case even if, as in the scenario above, almost all possible combinations of choices should be treated in the same way by the system. Sometimes homogeneity is desirable. In our trains and controller example, for instance, homogeneity strongly encourages cooperation among trains; no one can enter the gate unless everyone agree, and everyone knows that whoever gets to enter must leave as soon as he is asked to. On the other hand, we notice that it is impossible for any train to enter the gate unless all trains cooperate. This might be overly restrictive. By adding more roles, however, we can amend this while still retaining many of the benefits of using roles.
Example 2.2. In the previous example all trains were equal before the controller; the controller could not distinguish between trains. We could grant the agents much more individual identity by simply adding one more role, and in this example we sketch the result of doing so. First we make n t "copies" of the previous model sharing the state q 0 . In Figure 2 we illustrate the resulting model for n t = 3. In q 0 we let the trains vote for which train should be allowed to request permission to enter the tunnel. We assume majority voting, but we do not resolve ties. It means that if one train, x, gets more votes then all others we go to "his" state, q 1 x. Otherwise we just loop on q 0 . If we get to a q 1 -state, the controller can grant or reject the request. Contrary to the previous example the controller now knows which train is being proposed. If the controller grants the request, the selected train is put in a privileged role and given the sole choice of what to do with the permission.
The model has grown, so the trains gain autonomy at a cost. Still, this cost is much less than the cost of modelling this scenario in a cgs. There, if each train is to have the option to "vote" for any train in q 0 , each train must have n t actions available. We would get n nt t edges leading out from q 0 ! In the rcgs model we get a substantially smaller degree, the following table summarizes the difference (formulas for counting the degree are explained and discussed further in section 4) 
Before we move on we introduce some more notation. Given a role r ∈ R, a state q and a coalition A, the set of A-votes for r at q is V r (q, A), defined as follows:
(1)
(2) The A-votes for r at q gives the possible ways agents in A that are in role r at q can vote. Given a state q and a coalition A, we define the set of A-profiles at q:
is a complete profile iff the sum of its components
Given a (partial) profile F at a state q we write ext(q, F ) for the set of all complete profiles that extend F .
Given two states q, q ∈ Q, we say that q is a successor of q if there is some F ∈ P (q) such that δ(q, F ) = q . A computation is an infinite sequence λ = q 0 q 1 . . . of states such that for all positions i ≥ 0, q i+1 is a successor of q i . We follow the standard abbreviations, hence q-computation denotes a computation starting at q, and λ[i], λ[0, i] and λ[i, ∞] denote the i-th state, the finite prefix q 0 q 1 . . . q i and the infinite suffix q i q i+1 . . . of λ for any computation λ and its position i ≥ 0. An A-strategy for A ⊆ A is a function s A : Q → q∈Q P (q, A) such that s A (q) ∈ P (q, A) for all q ∈ Q. That is, s A maps states to A-profiles at that state. The set of all A-strategies is denoted by strat(A). If s is an Astrategy and we apply δ q to s(q), we obtain a unique new state q = δ q (s(q)). Iterating, we get the induced computation λ s,q = q 0 q 1 . . . such that q = q 0 and ∀i ≥ 0 : δ qi (s(q i )) = q i+1 . Given two strategies s and s , we say that s ≤ s iff ∀q ∈ Q : s(q) ≤ s (q). Given an A-strategy s A and a state q we get an associated set of computations out(s A , q). This is the set of all computations that can result when at any state, the players in A are voting in the way specified by s A : out(s A , q) = {λ s,q | s is an A-strategy and s ≥ s A } It will also be useful to have access to the set of states that can result in the next step when A ⊆ A follows strategy s A at state q, succ(q, s
New Semantics for ATL
Definition 2.2. Given a rcgs S and a state q in S, we define the satisfaction relation |= inductively:
for some i ≥ 0 and for all 0 ≤ j < i
Equivalence between RCGS and CGS
In this section we show that definition 2.2 provides an equivalent semantics for atl. We do this by first giving a surjective function f that takes an rcgs and returns a cgs. Then we show that S and f (S) satisfy the same atl formulas.
Remember that a concurrent game structure is a tuple A, Q, Π, π, d, δ where every element is defined as for an rcgs except d : A × Q → N + that maps agents and states to actions available at that state, and δ that is a partial function from states and action tuples to states defined by δ (q, t) = δ q (t) where δ q : a∈A [d a (q)] → Q is a transition function at q based on tuples of actions rather than profiles. The satisfaction relation for atl based on cgss can be defined exactly as in definition 2.2, the difference concerning only what counts as a strategy.
We , s A = s a1 , s a2 , . . . , s a |A| , for A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a |A| }. We denote the set of strategies for A ⊆ A by strat(A). When needed to distinguish between different structures we write strat(S, A) to indicate that we are talking about the set of strategies for A in S.
We say that a complete action tuple at q, t = i a1 , . . . , i an extends a strategy s A ∈ strat(A) if for all a j ∈ A we have i aj = s aj (q). We denote the set of all complete action tuples at q extending s A by ext(q, s A ). For any state q ∈ Q we have the set of all computations that comply with s A :
We define the set of s A -successors at q ∈ Q:
When we need to make clear which structure we are talking about, we write succ(S, q, s A ). Observe that q ∈ succ(q, s A ) iff q = λ [1] for some λ ∈ out(q, s A ). The translation function f from rcgs to cgs is defined as follows:
where:
where a ∈ R(q, r)
where for each role r v r = |{i ∈ R(q, r) | α i = 1}|, . . . , |{i ∈ R(q, r) | α i = A(q, r)}|
We can see straight away that f is surjective because for any cgs S with n agents we could define a rcgs S with that many roles where each role contains exactly one agent. A vote for a role r, v r , at q would then simply be a d a (q)-tuple consisting of a single 1 (representing the agents chosen action) and otherwise zeros. It is easy to verify that f (S) = S . Given either a cgs or an rcgs S, we define the set of sets of states that a coalition A can enforce in the next state of the game: f orce(S, q, A) = {succ(q, s A ) | s A is a strategy for A in S}.
The first thing we do towards showing equivalence is to describe a surjective function m : strat(f (S)) → strat(S) mapping action tuples and strategies of f (S) to profiles and strategies of S respectively. For all A ⊆ A and any action tuple for A at q, t q = α a1 , α a2 , ..., α a |A| with 1 ≤ α ai ≤ d ai (q) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |A|, the A-profile m(t q ) is defined in the following way: , 1) , . . . , v(t q , |R|) where for all 1 ≤ r ≤ |R| we have v(t q , r) = |{a ∈ A r,q | α a = 1}|, . . . , |{a ∈ A r,q | α a = A(q, r)}| Thus the i-th component of v(t q , r) will be the number of agents from A in role r at q that perform action i.
Given a strategy s A in f (S) we define the strategy m(s A ) for S by taking m(s A )(q) = m(s A (q)) for all q ∈ Q.
Surjectivity of m is helpful since it means that for every possible strategy that exists in the rcgs S, there is a corresponding one in f (S). This in turn means that when we quantify over strategies in one of S and f (S) we are implicitly also quantifying over strategies in the other. Showing equivalence, then, can be done by showing that these corresponding strategies have the same strength. Before we proceed, we give a proof of surjectivity of m.
Lemma 3.1. For any rcgs S and any A ⊆ A, the function m : strat(f (S), A) → strat(S, A) is surjective
Proof. Let p A be some strategy for A in S. We must show there is a strategy s A in f (S) such that m(s A ) = p A . For all q ∈ Q, we must define s A (q) appropriately. Consider the profile p A (q) = v 1 , . . . , v |R| and note that by definition of a profile, all v r for 1 ≤ r ≤ |R| are A-votes for r and that by definition of an A-vote, we have 1≤i≤A(q,r) v r (i) = |A r,q |. Also, for all agents a, a ∈ A r,q we know, by definition of f , that d a (q) = d a (q) = A(q, r).
From this it follows that there are functions α : A → N + such that for all a ∈ A, α(a) ∈ [d a (q)] and |{a ∈ A r,q | α(a) = i}| = v r (i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ A(q, r), i.e. v r = |{a ∈ A r,q |α(a) = 1}|, . . . , |{a ∈ A r,q |α(a) = A(q, r)}|
We choose some such α and s A = α(a 1 ), . . . , α(a |A| ) . Having defined s A in this way, it is clear that m(s A ) = p A .
Using the surjective function m we can prove the following lemma, showing that the "next time" strength of any coalition A is the same in S as it is in f (S). Proof. By definition of f orce and lemma 3.1 it is sufficient to show that for all s A ∈ strat(f (S), A), we have succ(S, m(s A ), q) = succ(f (S), s A , q). We show ⊆ as follows: Assume that q ∈ f orce(S, m(s A ), q). Then there is some complete profile P = v 1 , . . . , v |R| , extending m(s A )(q), such that δ(q, P ) = q . Let m(s A )(q) = w 1 , . . . , w |R| and form P = v 1 , . . . , v |R| defined by v i = v i − w i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |R|. Then each v i is an (A \ A)-vote for role i, meaning that the sum of entries in the tuple v i is |(A \ A) r,q |. This means that we can define a function α : A → N + such that for all a ∈ A, α(a) ∈ [d a (q)] and for all a ∈ A, α(a) = s a (q) and for every r ∈ R and every a ∈ (A \ A), and every 1 ≤ j ≤ A(q, r), |{a ∈ (A \ A) r,q | α(a) = j}| = v r (j). Having defined α like this it follows by definition of m that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ A(q, r), |{a ∈ A r,q | α(a) = j}| = w r (j). Then for all r ∈ R and all 1 ≤ j ≤ A(q, r) we have |{a ∈ R(q, r) | α(a) = j}| = v r (j). By definition of f (S) it follows that q = δ(q, P ) = δ (q, α) so that q ∈ f orce(f (S), s A , q). We conclude that f orce(S, f (s A ), q) ⊆ f orce(f (S), s A , q). The direction ⊇ follows easily from the definitions of m and f .
Given a structure S (with or without roles), and a formula φ, we define true(S, φ) = {q ∈ Q | S, q |= φ}. Equivalence of models S and f (S) is now demonstrated by showing that the equivalence in next time strength established in lemma 3.2 suffices to conclude that true(S, φ) = true(f (S), φ) for all φ.
Theorem 3.1. For any rcgs S, any φ and any q ∈ Q, we have S, q |= φ iff f (S), q |= CGS φ Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that for all φ, we have true(S, φ) = true(f (S), φ). We use induction on complexity of φ. The base case for atomic formulas and the inductive steps for Boolean connectives are trivial, while the case of A φ is a straightforward application of lemma 3.2. For the cases of A φ and A φUψ we rely on the following fixed point characterizations, which are well-known to hold for atl, see for instance [6] , and are also easily verified against definition 2.2:
We show the induction step for A φ, taking as induction hypothesis true(S, φ) = true(f (S), φ). The first equivalence above identifies Q = true(S, A φ) as the maximal subset of Q such that φ is true at every state in Q and such that A can enforce a state in Q from every state in Q , i.e. such that ∀q ∈ Q : ∃Q ∈ f orce(q, A) : Q ⊆ Q . Notice that a unique such set always exists. This is clear since the union of two sets satisfying the two requirements will itself satisfy them (possibly the empty set). The first requirement, namely that φ is true at all states in Q , holds for S iff if holds for f (S) by induction hypothesis. Lemma 3.2 states f orce(S, q, A) = f orce(f (S), q, A), and this implies that also the second requirement holds in S iff it holds in f (S). From this we conclude true(S, A φ) = true(f (S), A φ) as desired. The case for A φUψ is similar, using the second equivalence.
We have already seen that using roles can lead to a dramatic decrease in the size of atl-models. In this section we give a more formal account, first by investigating the size of models in terms of the number of roles, players and actions, then by an analysis of model checking atl over concurrent game structures with roles. Given a set of numbers [a] and a number n, it is a well-known combinatorial fact that the number of ways in which to choose n elements from [a], allowing repetitions, is (n+(a−1))! n!(a−1)! . Furthermore, this number satisfies the following two inequalities:
These two inequalities provide us with an upper bound on the size of rcgs models that makes it easy to compare their sizes to that of cgs models. Typically, the size of concurrent game structures is dominated by the size of the domain of the transition function. For an rcgs and a given state q ∈ Q this is the number of complete profiles at q. To measure it, remember that every complete profile is an |R|-tuple of votes v r , one for each role r ∈ R. It follows that |P (q)| is the set of all possible combinations of votes for each role. Also remember that a vote v r for r ∈ R is an A(q, r)-tuple such that the sum of entries is |R(q, r)|. Equivalently, the vote v r can be seen as the number of ways in which we can make |R(q, r)| choices, allowing repetitions, from a set of A(q, r) alternatives. Looking at it this way, we obtain:
We sum over all q ∈ Q to obtain what we consider to be the size of an rcgs S. In light of equation 2, it follows that the size of S is upper bounded by both of the following expressions.
We observe that growth in the size of models is polynomial in a = max q∈Q,r∈R A(r, q) if n = A and |R| is fixed, and polynomial in p = max q∈Q,r∈R |R(q, r)| if a and |R| are fixed. This identifies a significant potential advantage arising from introducing roles to the semantics of atl. The size of a cgs M , when measured in the same way, replacing complete profiles at q by complete action tuples at q, grows exponentially in the players whenever d a (q) > 1 for each player a. We stress that we are not just counting the number of transitions in our models differently. We do have an additional parameter, the roles, but this is a genuinely new semantic construct that gives rise to genuinely different semantic structures. We show that it is possible to use them to give the semantics of atl, but this does not mean that there is not more to be said about them. Particularly crucial is the question of model checking over rcgs models.
Model checking using roles
For strategic logics, checking satisfiability is usually non-tractable, and the question of model checking is often crucial in assessing the usefulness of different logics. For atl there is a well known "standard" algorithm, see e.g. [5] . It does model checking in time linear in the length of the formula and the size of the model. The algorithm is based on the fixed point equation 1 from the proof of Theorem 3.1, so it will work also when model checking rcgs models. It is not clear, however, how the high level description should be implemented and, crucially, what the complexity will be in terms of the new parameters that arise. Given a structure with roles, S, and a formula φ, the standard model checking algorithm returns the set true(S, φ), proceeding as detailed in algorithms 1 and 2.
Algorithm 1 mcheck(S, φ)
Given a structure S, a coalition A, a state q ∈ Q and a set of states Q , the method enf orce answers true or false depending on whether or not A can enforce Q from q. That is, it tells us if at q there is Q ∈ f orce(q, A) such that Q ⊆ Q . Given a fixed length formula and a fixed number of states, this step dominates the running time of mcheck (algorithm 1). It is also the only part of the standard algorithm that behaves in a different way after addition of roles to the structures. It involves the following steps:
For all profiles F ∈ P (q, A) the algorithm runs through all complete profiles F ∈ P (q) that extend F . Over cgss, given a coalition A and two action tuples t = α a1 , α a2 , . . . , α a |A| , t = α a1 , α a2 , . . . , α a |A| for A at q, the sets of complete action tuples that extend t and t respectively do not intersect. It follows that running through all such extensions for all possible action tuples for A at q is at most linear in the total number of complete action tuples at q. This is no longer the case for rcgs models. Given two profiles P, P for A at q, there can be many shared extensions. In fact, P and P can share exponentially many in terms of the number of players and actions available. 6 So, in general, running enf orce requires us to make several passes through the set of all complete profiles, and the complexity is no longer linear. Still, it is polynomial in the number of complete profiles, since for any coalition A and state q we have |P (q, A)| ≤ |P (q)|, meaning that the complexity of enf orce is upper bounded by |P (q)| 2 . It follows that model checking of atl over concurrent game structures with roles is polynomial in the size of the model. We summarize this result. repeating calls to enf orce and not just do a Boolean check for every new instance in the way we do it here. This aspect is not crucial for our analysis, so we do not address it further 6 To see this, consider P = v1, v2 . . . , v |R| and P = v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v |R| . Each vr, v r ∈ VA(q, r) sums to Σ 1≤j≤A(q,r) vi(j) = |Aq,r|. Then form a complete profile P = v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v |R| at q such that for all 1 ≤ r ≤ |R| and all 1 ≤ j ≤ A(q, r) we have v r (j) = max(vr(j), v r (j)). Then, if it exists, choose a coalition A such that |A r,q | = Σ 1≤j≤A(q,r) v r (j). It is clear that the number of complete profiles that extends both v and v is equal to the number of all A \ A -profiles at q.
cgs models can be bigger by an exponential factor, making model checking much easier after adding roles. In light of the bounds we have on the size of models, c.f. equation 3, we find that as long as the roles and the actions remain fixed, complexity of model checking is only polynomial in the number of agents. This is a potentially significant argument in favor of roles.
In practice, however, finding an optimal rcgs for a given cgs model M might be at least as difficult as model checking on M directly. It involves identifying the structure from f − (M ) that has the minimum number of roles. In general, one cannot expect this task to have sub-linear complexity in the size of M .
7 Roles should be used at the modelling stage, as they give the modeller an opportunity for exploiting homogeneity in the system under consideration. We think that it is reasonable to hypothesize that in practice, most large scale systems that lends themselves well to modelling by atl do so precisely because they exhibit significant homogeneity. If not, identifying an accurate atl model of the system, and model checking it, seems unlikely to be tractable at all.
The question arises as to whether or not using an rcgs is always the best choice, or if there are situations when the losses incurred in the complexity of model checking outweigh the gains we make in terms of the size of models. A general investigation of this in terms of how fixing or bounding the number of roles affect membership in complexity classes is left for future work. Here, we conclude with the following proposition which states that as long we use the standard algorithm, model checking any cgs M can be done at least as quickly by model checking an arbitrary S ∈ f − (M ). Proof. It is clear that for any S ∈ f − (M ), running mcheck(S, φ) and mcheck(M, φ), a difference in overall complexity can arise only from a difference in the complexity of enf orce. So we compare the complexity of enf orce(S, A, q, Q ) and enf orce(M, A, q, Q ) for some arbitrary q ∈ Q, Q ⊆ Q. The complexity in both cases involves passing through all complete extensions of all strategies for A at q. The sizes of these sets are can be compared as follows, the first inequality is an instance of equation 2 and the equalities follow from definition of f and the fact that M = f (S). We started with the number of profiles (transitions) we need to inspect when running enf orce on S at q, and ended with the number of action tuples (transitions) we need to inspect when running enf orce on M = f (S). Since we showed the first to be smaller or equal to the latter and the execution of all other elements of mcheck are identical between S and M , the claim follows.
Conclusions, related and future work
In this paper we have described a new type of semantics for the strategic logic atl. We have provided motivational examples and argued that although in principle model checking atl interpreted over concurrent game structures with roles is harder than the standard approach, it is still polynomial and generates exponentially smaller models. We believe this provides conclusive evidence that concurrent game structures with roles are an interesting semantics for atl, and should be investigated further.
Relating our work to ideas already present in the literature we find it somewhat similar to the concept of exploiting symmetry in model checking, as investigated by Sistla and Godefroid [12] . Our approach is however different, since we we only look at agent symmetries in atl. When it comes to work related directly to strategic logics, we find no similar ideas present, hence concluding that our approach is indeed novel.
For future work we plan on investigating the homogeneous aspect of our 'roles' in more depth. We are currently working on a derivative of atl with a different language that will fully exploit the role based semantics.
